This paper identi…es a fundamental con ‡ict of interest between managers and shareholders in risk taking decisions and explores its implications for the relation between external governance mechanisms, corporate investment, and value. Using a dynamic panel GMM estimator to address endogeneity, we show that antitakeover provisions (ATPs) lead to more conservative investment decisions, including relatively less investment in R&D, more investment in PPE, and more diversifying acquisitions, and that these e¤ects are concentrated among high idiosyncratic volatility …rms -i.e., …rms with agency costs of idiosyncratic risk. In addition, we …nd that ATPs lead to large drops in …rm value, and that this negative valuation e¤ect of ATPs is also concentrated among high idiosyncratic volatility …rms -i.e., the …rms for which ATP-induced conservatism is more pronounced. These results suggest that ATPs lead to excess managerial conservatism. Thus, by curbing managers'tendency to avoid value-enhancing risks, corporate governance reforms can create value for shareholders.
Introduction
Does corporate governance create value for shareholders? A recent empirical literature, starting with Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) , establishes a connection between …rm value and measures of external governance -i.e., indices of antitakeover provisions (ATPs) that measure managers'exposure to the market for corporate control. 1 However, the question of how governance and value are related remains wide open. In particular, we know little about the precise channels through which external governance mechanisms matter for …rm value. In an attempt to make progress on this front, we identify a fundamental con ‡ict of interest between managers and shareholders in risk taking decisions and explore its implications for the relation between external governance mechanisms, corporate investment, and value.
There are two main reasons why managerial risk taking decisions are a potentially important channel through which ATPs matter for shareholders. First, risky investments such as R&D are a critical input to innovation and …rm growth in modern economies. Thus, ine¢ ciencies stemming from these decisions can have a large impact on …rm value. Second, agency theory suggests a systematic relation between ATPs and managerial risk taking. This relation should be negative if managers who are relatively under-diversi…ed (Amihud and Lev (1981) ) and want to protect their private bene…ts (Jensen (1986) ) opt to pass up value enhancing risky projects. In this case, by increasing managerial discretion, ATPs result in more positive net present value risky projects to be foregone. However, a positive relation could also emerge if ATPs reduce managers' downside risk (likelihood of hostile threats, forced turnover), which in turn facilitates risk-shifting to debtholders (Jensen and Meckling (1976) ). While theory makes ambiguous predictions, there is no direct empirical evidence that ATPs destroy value by exacerbating risk-related agency problems. This paper …lls that gap and documents a robust link between ATPs and managerial risk taking in corporate investment decisions.
The focus of our study on managerial risk taking decisions in corporate investment enables us to employ a novel empirical strategy aimed at identifying the impact of ATPs on corporate investment and value. Our identi…cation strategy consists of two main parts. First, we use basic theory principles from CAPM to gain identi…cation of the risk taking channel. In particular, we exploit a direct prediction of CAPM theory (see Craine (1988) , and, for a related discussion, Milgrom and Roberts (1992, Ch.13) and Guay (1999) ): the only risk that matters for relatively well-diversi…ed shareholders is the extent to which their …rms stock returns co-vary with the market -i.e., the …rms' market : However, managers are relatively under-diversi…ed (due to either speci…city of their human capital or incentive-related equity ownership; Amihud and Lev (1981) emphasize that managers are under-diversi…ed). Thus, not only covariance, but also total …rm risk (variance) matters for managers. This simple reasoning suggests that risk-related agency con ‡icts are likely to be more severe when the wedge between the variance of …rm returns and their covariance with the market is larger. We observe that this is the case when …rm-speci…c (idiosyncratic) volatility is higher. The fundamental con ‡ict of interest that arises from this di¤erence in risk preferences between managers and shareholders leads to what we de…ne as the agency cost of idiosyncratic volatility.
The second part of our empirical strategy recognizes that, although useful to identify our speci…c risk taking channel, our idea of using CAPM is not su¢ cient to identify the causal impact of ATPs on …rm investment and value. In order to address the concern that investment, …rm value (investment opportunities), and ATPs may be jointly determined, we use a dynamic panel "system" GMM approach to estimate dynamic capital expenditures, R&D, and valuation (Tobin's Q) regressions. 2 Our estimation procedure treats all the explanatory variables -the entire set of ATPs and control variables -as potentially endogenous, based on important recent studies that emphasize the endogeneity of governance mechanisms (see Coles, Lemmon, and Meschke (2006) , and Lehn, Patro, and Zhao (2006) ; the evidence in Anderson, Bates, Bizjak, and Lemmon (2000) is particularly relevant to our paper, as they show that governance structures are sensitive to …rm risk pro…les). Further, we use a …rm's history as valid instrument for its current ATPs by exploiting the key insight of the optimal governance literature that …rm's historical performance and characteristics ought to be correlated with current governance variables.
Our GMM approach enables us to derive estimates of the e¤ect of ATPs on corporate investment and value while controlling for the feedback e¤ect of corporate investment and value on ATPs -i.e., within an empirical setting that controls for unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity, and reverse causality. Finally, the speci…cation of our dynamic capital expenditures and R&D regressions includes only variables whose coe¢ cients have a clear structural interpretation with respect to the original optimization problem (the "Euler condition"of the standard q-theory of investment with quadratic adjustment costs). The advantage of this approach is that it controls for expectations and isolates the e¤ect of ATPs on investment decisions over and above standard determinants of e¢ cient investment (Bond and Van Reenen (2007) survey the literature).
Our results show that ATPs lead to more conservative investment decisions, including relatively less investment in R&D and more investment in PPE, and that these e¤ects are concentrated among high idiosyncratic volatility …rms -i.e., …rms that have agency costs of idiosyncratic volatility. Using a sample of 960 acquisitions from 1990 to 2006, we also o¤er evidence that diversifying acquisition decisions display an analogous pattern. These results show that ATPs lead to managerial conservatism. However, they leave open the question of whether entrenched managers take too few risks in their investment decisions or unentrenched managers take too many risks. In other words, as Tirole (2003, p.307 ) puts it, do managers take too many risks when their jobs are endangered or are they too conservative when their jobs are relatively secure?
Our dynamic valuation (Tobin's Q) regressions address this important question. We …nd that ATPs lead to large drops in …rm value, and that this negative valuation e¤ect of ATPs is concentrated among high idiosyncratic volatility …rms -i.e., the …rms for which ATP-induced conservatism is more pronounced. These results suggest that ATPs lead to excess managerial conservatism. Thus, by curbing managers'tendency to avoid value-enhancing risks, corporate governance reforms can create value for shareholders.
Our study makes three main contributions. Our paper is the …rst, of which we are aware, to identify the agency cost of …rm-speci…c risk and to document that ATPs destroy value by exacerbating risk-related agency problems in corporate investment. Thus, we identify a clear and important channel (risk taking) and a speci…c mechanism (corporate investment) through which takeover defenses matter for shareholders. Our evidence shows that ATPs exacerbate shareholder-manager agency costs by allowing managers to make ine¢ ciently conservative investments without facing a serious threat of losing corporate control. This o¤ers strong support to the agency-based interpretation of the negative relation between ATPs and …rm value provided by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and subsequent literature. 3 Our direct evidence complements recent work by Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2006), who also study the market for corporate control, but focus on corporate acquisitions.
Our study also provides a novel perspective over the …nding in the literature that …rm 3 Other studies of the governance-performance linkage are Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) valuation and ATPs are weakly linked. In fact, the focus of previous studies on estimating the e¤ect of governance on performance across a large variety of …rms may have contributed to the mixed results. By allowing the valuation e¤ect of ATPs to vary across …rms with di¤erent levels of idiosyncratic risk, we obtain much sharper estimates of the cost of ATPs for shareholders.
Our evidence strongly suggests the need for researchers to control for …rm-speci…c volatility in their study of the consequences of governance for shareholder value, since a failure to do so may lead to signi…cantly underestimate the valuation e¤ects of governance.
Second, we contribute to the classical literature on agency problems and corporate diversi…-cation (see, for example, Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997), May (1995) , Anderson, Bates, Bizjak, and Lemmon (2000)) by establishing that the market for corporate control provides managers strong incentives to take value enhancing risks, and in particular pro…table investment. Our results are complementary to the earlier literature, which has traditionally focused on managerial stock ownership and other incentive features of managerial compensation contracts (see Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) and references therein). A well-known issue with using managerial equity holdings to proxy for agency problems is that higher stock ownership can have both an incentive and an entrenchment e¤ect (Mørck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988)). Moreover, higher ownership also makes managers less diversi…ed, thus introducing potentially confounding e¤ects.
In this sense, the market for corporate control o¤ers evidence on managerial entrenchment that is less likely to be subject to these o¤setting e¤ects.
Our …ndings are also of importance to the debate on the role of the market for corporate control in providing incentives for managers to make long-term risky investments. Stein (1988) challenges the standard agency view and develops a model where takeover threats actually end up curtailing managerial incentives to take risks. Our …ndings fail to support this view and o¤er strong support for the alternative agency view that takeover impediments may reduce managerial incentives to engage in risky value-enhancing investments. Our results are consistent with the event-study evidence in Meulbroek, Mitchell, Mulherin, Netter, and Poulsen (1990).
Third, we contribute a novel identi…cation approach to the literature that seeks to understand the consequences of agency problems for corporate investment and …rm performance (see Stein The organization of the paper is as follows. Section II presents the empirical speci…cation and describes our estimation method. Data and sample summary statistics are presented in Section III. The main empirical results are presented in Sections IV and V. Section VI concludes.
Empirical Speci…cation and Estimation
In order to implement empirical tests our risk-taking channel we need to estimate the impact of external governance mechanisms (ATPs) on …rm investment policies and value. We consider three types of investment policies (investment in PPE (capital expenditures), R&D, and diversifying acquisitions) and one standard measure of value, Tobin's Q. An important concern that needs to be addressed is that external governance mechanisms are endogenous (see Coles, Lemmon, and Meschke (2006), and Lehn, Patro, and Zhao (2006)) or, in other words, that investment, …rm value, and ATPs may be jointly determined. Due to the endogeneity of ATPs, simple regression analysis would lead to incorrect inferences and we need to address the potential bias due to the correlation between ATPs, investment, and value over time. In this section, we start with a brief discussion of our main hypotheses and then detail our empirical identi…cation and estimation strategy. Another investment avenue through which a conservative manager could reduce risk is by increasing the level of …rm diversi…cation, that is by engaging in diversifying acquisitions. Managerial risk aversion as a motive for diversi…cation is suggested in Amihud and Lev (1981) , and May (1995) . To the extent that we can construct measures of diversi…cation that would allow us to capture expected decreases in …rm risk (see data section for details), we expect that managerial conservatism should be associated with higher levels of diversi…cation.
Based on these arguments, we expect that ATPs would lead to lower investment in R&D expenditures, higher investment in capital expenditures, and increased diversi…cation. However, in order to gain identi…cation of our risk-taking channel, our approach is to ask when ATPs lead to conservatism in investment decisions. We use basic theory principles from CAPM to obtain …ner predictions of the risk taking channel. In particular, we exploit a direct prediction of CAPM theory (see Craine (1988) , and, for a related discussion, Milgrom and Roberts (1992, Ch.13) and Guay (1999) ): the only risk that matters for relatively well-diversi…ed shareholders is the extent to which their …rms stock returns co-vary with the market -i.e., the …rms'market : However, managers are relatively under-diversi…ed (due to either speci…city of their human capital or incentive-related equity ownership; Amihud and Lev (1981) emphasize that managers are under-diversi…ed). Thus, not only covariance, but also total …rm risk (variance) matters for managers. This simple reasoning suggests that risk-related agency con ‡icts are likely to be more severe when the wedge between the variance of …rm returns and their covariance with the market is larger. We observe that this is the case when …rm-speci…c (idiosyncratic) volatility is higher. The fundamental con ‡ict of interest that arises from this di¤erence in risk preferences between managers and shareholders leads to what we de…ne as the agency cost of idiosyncratic volatility.
In summary, our primary hypotheses are that ATPs should lead to lower investment in R&D expenditures, higher investment in capital expenditures, and increased diversi…cation, and that these e¤ects should be concentrated among high idiosyncratic risk …rms. Finally, to the extent that managerial conservatism is excessive -i.e., to the extent that it is a manifestation of agency problems -we would expect a negative impact of ATPs on …rm value, particularly among high idiosyncratic risk …rms.
Speci…cation In order to take endogeneity seriously, we need to specify an empirical model that can deal with both static (due to omitted …xed e¤ects) and dynamic (due to autoregressive relation in ATPs, investment, and value through time) correlation. To this end, we use the dynamic panel "system" GMM approach developed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991) , and Blundell and Bond (1998) and estimate dynamic capital expenditures, R&D, and valuation (Tobin's Q) regressions. 4 Our estimation procedure treats all the explanatory variables -the entire set of ATPs and control variables -as potentially endogenous and uses a …rm's history as valid instrument for its current ATPs by exploiting the key insight of the optimal governance literature that …rm's historical performance and characteristics ought to be correlated with current governance variables. This dynamic GMM approach enables us to derive estimates of the e¤ect of ATPs on corporate investment and value while controlling for the feedback e¤ect of corporate investment and value on ATPs -i.e., within an empirical setting that controls for unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity, and reverse causality.
We consider the following dynamic speci…cation:
where y is investment in PPE, R&D, and …rm value (Tobin's Q), AT P is a …rm-level index of antitakeover provisions, our key explanatory variable, and X is a set of controls. The subscripts i and t denote the …rm and the year, respectively, and superscript denotes idiosyncratic volatility. We split our sample into two sub-samples, based on whether …rms have relatively high or low idiosyncratic volatility (above or below median). Thus, letting = H denote high idiosyncratic volatility …rms and = L denote low idiosyncratic volatility …rms, we e¤ectively estimate (1) separately in each of the two sub-samples. By including the lagged dependent variable in our speci…cation, we can control for the dynamic correlation between ATPs and the dependent variable -i.e., lagged correlations due to the autoregressive relation between ATPs and investment or value. We also control for time-speci…c e¤ects, t , and …rm-speci…c e¤ects, i , which eliminate any potential bias that may arise from unobserved heterogeneity.
Our speci…cation allows for all slope coe¢ cients to vary with idiosyncratic volatility, thus allowing for the e¤ect of ATPs to be heterogeneous across …rms. Our null hypothesis is that the di¤erence between the (slope) coe¢ cients on ATPs between the two sub-samples equals
Finally, an additional important feature of this speci…cation is worth emphasizing. It is straightforward to show that our speci…cation is equivalent to a dynamic vector autoregressive system of simultaneous equations where all the variables (y; AT P; X) are treated as potentially endogenous and are speci…ed as linear functions of own lags, the other variables, and the lags of the other variables (see Appendix for a formal derivation). Thus, our approach controls for both simultaneity and reverse causality.
We estimate equation ( insure that the …rm's far history (beyond a certain number of lags) can be considered exogenous with respect to current shocks. Technically, for our GMM estimates to be consistent, we need the following orthogonality conditions to hold: E(y i;t k " i;t ) = E(AT P i;t k " i;t ) = E(X i;t k " i;t ) = 0;
8k > p. An important feature of our approach is that we can test the validity of our instruments by using the conventional test of overidentifying restrictions proposed by Sargan (1958).
There is one last important concern with our speci…cation that needs to be addressed: ATPs vary signi…cantly across …rms but are quite stable over time for any given …rm (1,049 out of 2,302 …rms in our sample display the same value of ATPs for all years in the sample). In other words, the bulk (more than 87 per cent) of the variation in ATPs is cross-sectional, whereas the explanatory power of time dummies is less than 1 per cent. Thus, by including …rm …xed-e¤ect or taking …rst di¤erences, we are losing most of the variation in the data, which may exacerbate the bias due to measurement errors in variables by decreasing the signal-to-noise ratio (see Griliches and Hausman, 1986) . The fact that ATPs are very persistent is also likely to give rise to a weak-instrument problem. 5 Therefore, an econometric technique that exploits the cross-sectional variation in ATPs would be preferable in order to improve the precision of the estimated coe¢ cients.
To address this issue and, thus, reduce the potential biases and imprecision associated with the di¤erence estimator, we estimate (1) using a method that combines in a system the regression in di¤erences with the regression in levels (Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) ; see Appendix for details). Analogously to the regression in di¤erences, we use historical values of variables as instruments (lagged di¤erences as instruments for the corresponding variable levels). These additional instruments are valid if there is no correlation between lagged di¤erences of the explanatory variables and …rm-speci…c e¤ects -i.e., although the speci…c e¤ect may be correlated with the explanatory variables, the correlation is supposed to be constant over time. This assumption is plausible if the …rm-speci…c e¤ects proxy for factors such as managerial ability. An important feature of our approach is that we can also test the validity of these additional instruments by using the di¤erence Sargan test proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) .
In summary, we employ the system GMM estimator to generate consistent and e¢ cient parameter estimates of equation (1) : Moreover, by splitting our sample into two sub-samples based on whether …rms have relatively high or low idiosyncratic volatility, we can test whether the e¤ect of ATPs is heterogeneous across …rms with high vs. low idiosyncratic volatility, and, thus, identify our risk-taking channel.
Estimation We estimate equation (1) using the system GMM procedure developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) for dynamic panel models with lagged dependent variables. We treat all right-hand side variables as potentially endogenous and use lagged variables dated t-3 and t-4 as instruments. The standard errors are corrected for the well-known downward bias in small samples (e.g., Arellano and Bond (1991) and Windmeijer (2005) ). Moreover, the standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and any arbitrary pattern of within-…rm serial correlation (Petersen (2006)). The instruments must be lagged at least three periods if the error term follows a …rm-speci…c MA(1) process (see Bond and Van Reenen (2007) ).
The consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the validity of the assumption that the error terms do not exhibit serial correlation and on the validity of the instruments. To address these issues we use three speci…cation tests suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998) . The …rst test examines the hypothesis that the error term " it is not serially correlated. We test whether the di¤erenced error term is second-order serially correlated (by construction, the di¤erenced error term is probably …rst-order serially correlated even if the original error term is not). The second is a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, which tests the overall validity of the instruments by analyzing the sample analog of the moment conditions used in the estimation process. Failure to reject the null hypotheses of both tests gives support to our model. The third test is the Di¤erence Sargan test that evaluates the validity of the additional orthogonality condition in the system GMM.
Sample and Data Construction
Our main data on …rm-level governance, idiosyncratic volatility of returns, and …rm policies and valuation is drawn from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) database, the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and Compustat. We collect these data, combine them into our dataset, and complement them with a variety of additional …rm characteristics, which we use as controls. This section provides details on the dataset and on the construction of our variables. Additional details on de…nition and sources for all variables are in Appendix A.
Our main dataset consists of all …rms with governance information from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) database between 1990 and 2006. We exclude …rms in …nancial (SIC 6000-6999) and regulated (SIC 4900-4999) industries and …rms with dual-class status. We combine governance data from IRRC with …rm characteristics, such as our idiosyncratic volatility, Tobin's Q, and size. Idiosyncratic volatility is measured using daily returns from CRSP.
Firm value, policy, and control variables are calculated from Compustat. This leaves us with a total of 18,125 …rm-year observations. For all variables, we remove outliers by winsorizing the extreme observations in the one-percent left or right tail of the distribution.
Governance Measures
We experiment with a variety of …rm governance indices which have been employed in the empirical literature on takeover threats as a source of external governance. Thus, our proxies of external governance aim at measuring the extent to which a …rm is protected against a takeover.
We use three …rm-speci…c proxies, which are all based on information from IRRC for the years 1990 to 2006. These IRRC data are assembled and reported about every two years (1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006) . As is standard in the literature, we assume that the index remains unchanged for the years in which IRRC does not report scores. 6 Our …rst governance proxy is the GIM-index constructed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick to shareholder by-law amendments, limits to shareholder charter amendments, supermajority requirements for mergers, poison pills, and golden parachutes. 6 Although both measures show little within …rm change from point to point, our results do not depend on the assumption that the value of the antitakeover provision index in-between survey years is unchanged. In unreported results based solely on data from the survey years, we replicate the reported results. 7 A detailed description of takeover defenses included in the GIM-index can be found in GIM, Appendix A.
Our third proxy is the SB&P-index, which is based on the sum of staggered board and poison pill provisions and, thus, ranges from 0 to 2. This index is motivated by the argument 
Firm Risk and Idiosyncratic Volatility
We use data from CRSP to construct idiosyncratic volatility measure for each …rm in the IRRC sample, which we estimate for each month using daily return data. We use the one-month
Treasury bill rate from Ibboson Associates as the risk-free rate and take CRSP's value-weighted returns of all stocks as the market portfolio.
For each …rm i in the sample, our measure of idiosyncratic volatility is based on a projection of the …rm's excess return, r it , on the market's excess return, r mt . We …rst obtain estimates of each stock's monthly market , denoted^ , individual stock volatility , denoted^ , and market return volatility , denoted^ , from the basic market model using daily data. Denoting 
Firm Investment and Valuation Measures
In order to examine the relation between governance and …rm policies and value, we supplement the IRRC data set with various items from the COMPUSTAT and CRSP. We consider two investment policy variables: physical investment, measured as the ratio of capital expenditures to assets; R&D, measured as the ratio of research and development expenditures to assets. As a proxy for …rm valuation, we use Tobin's Q, which is the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets. Market value of assets is de…ned as book value of assets plus market equity minus the sum of book equity and balance sheet deferred taxes (Kaplan and Zingales (1997) ).
In our analysis of diversifying acquisitions, we consider two ex-ante diversi…cation measures based on a sample of 960 corporate acquisitions announced and successfully completed between prior to the acquisition. For each of these diversi…cation proxies, the lower the value, the more diversifying the acquisition.
Our list of controls includes standard …rm characteristics, such as, for example, size, cash ‡ow, and leverage, whose relationship with investment decisions and …rm value has been documented in previous studies. A complete list and detailed de…nitions of these controls are in the Appendix and in the respective tables. Table 1 presents summary statistics for our sample. Consistent with previous studies, our median …rm scores values of 9 for the GIM-index, 2 for the E-index, and 1 for the SB&P index.
Mean idiosyncratic volatility, 2 i" (annualized), over our sample period is 0.19, which is higher than that found in previous studies of idiosyncratic volatility that use the entire CRSP sample (e.g., Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001)), but in line with other studies that focus on the IRRC sample (e.g., Ferreira and Laux (2007)). Other …rm characteristics are largely in line with previous studies such as Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) . Table 2 reports the top and bottom volatility …rms in our sample and their respective (4-SIC) industries.
4 Corporate Governance, Risk-Taking, and Investment Decisions This section examines the relation between corporate governance (ATPs) and corporate investment decisions using the dynamic panel GMM approach described in Section 2. In particular,
we study the relation between ATPs and capital expenditures and R&D expenditures. We also o¤er evidence on ATPs and diversifying acquisitions decisions from a sample of 960 corporate acquisitions announced and successfully completed between 1990 and 2006. An important feature of our GMM approach is that we can rigorously examine the validity of the instrument set that we use in the dynamic GMM estimation; i.e., we can examine the strength and exogeneity of using the …rm's history as instrument for current governance.
Capital Expenditures
A …rst important way in which managers can tilt the risk pro…le of their …rm toward safer projects is through excess investment in tangible assets, such as capital expenditures. Table   3 presents two-step GMM coe¢ cient estimates and standard errors for dynamic investment equations described in (1) for IRRC …rms in the 1990 to 2006 period. Columns (1)- (3) report results for the entire sample. Columns (4)- (6) and (7)- (9) report results for the two sub-samples of high and low idiosyncratic risk …rm. This sample split, we have argued, allows us to identify the risk-taking channel.
Before discussing the coe¢ cient estimates, it is important to test of the validity of our speci…cation and set of instruments. If the assumptions of our speci…cation are valid, by construction the residuals in …rst di¤erences should be correlated, but there should be no serial correlation in second di¤erences. The p-values for the m1 and m2 statistics con…rm that this is the case regardless of whether we consider the entire sample or sample splits. The second test is a Sargan test of over-identi…cation. The dynamic panel GMM estimator uses multiple lags as instruments.
This means that our system is over-identi…ed and provides us with an opportunity to carry out the test of over-identi…cation. The p-values for this test show that we cannot reject the validity of the instruments and this is the case both for the entire sample and the sample splits. Finally, the p-value for our Di¤erence-Sargan test implies that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the additional subset of instruments used in the system GMM estimates is indeed exogenous. Thus, overall our speci…cation tests provide empirical support for the validity of our speci…cation and instruments.
Moving on to consider the coe¢ cient estimates of ATPs, columns (1)- (3) show that regardless of the ATP index used, ATPs do not have a statistically signi…cant e¤ect on capital expenditures in the entire sample. Among controls that are standard in the literature, we …nd expected coef-…cient signs: (lagged) gross cash ‡ow has a statistically signi…cant positive e¤ect and investment adjustment costs have a statistically signi…cant negative e¤ect.
However, our dynamic GMM estimates o¤er strong evidence in support of our risk-taking channel. In fact, as can be seen by contrasting columns (4)- (6) with columns (7)- (9), the results indicate a signi…cant positive impact of ATPs on capital expenditures which is robust across ATP indices, but only for …rms with relatively high idiosyncratic volatility. The coe¢ cient estimate on ATPs implies that, for …rms with relatively high idiosyncratic volatility, the e¤ect of ATPs on capital expenditures is economically signi…cant. For example, looking at the E index (column 6), moving a …rm from the lowest (0 provisions) to the highest (6 provisions) level of takeover protection leads to an increase in capital expenditures of about 2% of assets -an increase which is about 40% the median capital expenditure investment rate in our sample (5%). By contrast, for …rms with low idiosyncratic volatility, ATPs do not have a statistically signi…cant e¤ect on capital expenditures.
R&D
A second important way in which managers can tilt the risk pro…le of their …rm toward safer projects is by reducing investment in intangible assets, such as R&D. Table 3 presents two-step GMM coe¢ cient estimates and standard errors for dynamic R&D equations described in (1) for IRRC …rms in the 1990 to 2006 period. Columns (1)- (3) report results for the entire sample.
Columns (4)- (6) and (7)- (9) report results for the two sub-samples of high and low idiosyncratic risk …rm. This sample split, we have argued, allows us to identify the risk-taking channel.
Before discussing the coe¢ cient estimates, we discuss the results of the tests of the validity of our speci…cation and set of instruments. The p-values for the m1 and m2 statistics con…rm the validity of our speci…cation both for the entire sample and the sample splits. The p-value of the Sargan and Di¤erence-Sargan tests, however, show that we cannot reject the validity of the instruments only for the sample splits regressions. Our interpretation of these results is that they support our risk-taking channel, since a speci…cation that allows for the risk taking channel -i.e., for heterogenous e¤ects of ATPs on R&D between low vs. high idiosyncratic volatility …rms -is clearly superior.
Moving on to consider the coe¢ cient estimates of ATPs, our dynamic GMM estimates o¤er strong evidence in support of the risk-taking channel. In fact, as can be seen by contrasting columns (4)- (6) with columns (7)- (9), the results indicate a signi…cant negative impact of ATPs on capital expenditures which is robust across ATP indices, but only for …rms with relatively high idiosyncratic volatility. The coe¢ cient estimate on ATPs implies that, for …rms with relatively high idiosyncratic volatility, the e¤ect of ATPs on R&D is economically signi…cant.
For example, looking at the E index (column 6), moving a …rm from the lowest (0 provisions) to the highest (6 provisions) level of takeover protection leads to a drop in R&D of about 9% of sales -a drop which is about as large as the mean R&D expenditure rate in our sample.
By contrast, for …rms with low idiosyncratic volatility, depending on which index is considered, ATPs either do not have a statistically signi…cant e¤ect on R&D (for SB&P and E indices) or have a small and only marginally signi…cant e¤ect (GIM index).
Diversifying Acquisitions
A third important way in which managers can lower the risk pro…le of their …rm is by changing the level of diversi…cation. To test this hypothesis, we use a sample of 960 corporate acquisitions announced and successfully completed between 1990 and 2006. We use the following two exante diversi…cation measures to capture the extent to which a given acquisition can implement diversi…cation in the portfolio sense: 1) the ex-ante covariance of equity returns between the acquirer and the target …rms; and 2) the implied change in acquirers'equity variance resulting from the acquisition. For each of these diversi…cation proxies, the lower the value, the more diversifying the acquisition. Table 5 presents results from multivariate regressions of the ex-ante proxies for diversi…cation on ATP indices. Panels A and B report results for the …rst (covariance of equity returns) and second (implied change in variance) proxy, respectively. For each panel, columns (1)- (3) report results for the entire sample. Columns (4)- (6) and (7)- (9) report results for the two sub-samples of high and low idiosyncratic risk …rm. This sample split, we have argued, allows us to identify the risk-taking channel.
The coe¢ cient estimates of ATPs o¤er further evidence of a link between weak corporate governance and managerial conservatism. In fact, robustly across di¤erent ATP indices and for both proxies of diversi…cation, ATPs increase the likelihood of diversifying acquisitions. Moreover, the negative positive between ATPs and diversi…cation is concentrated among high idiosyncratic volatility …rms. The coe¢ cient estimate on ATPs implies that, for …rms with relatively high idiosyncratic volatility, the e¤ect of ATPs on diversi…cation is economically signi…cant. Looking at the E index (column 6), moving a …rm from the lowest (0 provisions) to the highest (6 provisions) level of takeover protection leads to a drop in (monthly) equity covariance of about 1% -a drop which is about as large as the mean level of diversi…cation in our sample (0.9%).
By contrast, for …rms with low idiosyncratic volatility, depending on which index is considered, ATPs either do not have a statistically signi…cant e¤ect on R&D (for SB&P and E indices) or have a small and marginally signi…cant e¤ect (GIM index).
Overall, these results provide further support for our risk-taking channel, according to which ATPs lead to conservative investment decisions among managers exposed to high …rm-speci…c risk. (2005), and Cremers and Nair (2003)), 9 our GMM approach allows us to identify the e¤ect of ATPs on value within a setting that addresses potential endogeneity concerns with OLS estimates in Tobin's Q-regressions (see Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) for a di¤erent identi…cation strategy). Our risk-taking channel implies that there are risk-related agency problems and, thus, based on our results from investment decisions, we expect that the negative valuation e¤ect of ATPs should be concentrated among high idiosyncratic volatility …rms -i.e., the …rms for which ATP-induced conservatism is more pronounced. Table 6 presents two-step GMM coe¢ cient estimates and standard errors for dynamic Tobin's Q equations described in (1) for IRRC …rms in the 1990 to 2006 period. Columns (1)- (3) report results for the entire sample. Columns (4)- (6) and (7)- (9) report results for the two sub-samples of high and low idiosyncratic risk …rm.
Before discussing the coe¢ cient estimates, we discuss the results of the tests of the validity of our speci…cation and set of instruments. The p-values for the m1 and m2 statistics con…rm the validity of our speci…cation both for the entire sample and the sample splits. The p-value of the Sargan test, however, show that we cannot reject the validity of the instruments only for the sample splits regressions. Our interpretation of these results is that they support our risk-taking channel, since a speci…cation that allows for the risk taking channel -i.e., for valuation e¤ects of ATPs that are heterogeneous between low vs. high idiosyncratic volatility …rms -is clearly superior.
Moving on to consider the coe¢ cient estimates of ATPs, our dynamic GMM estimates o¤er strong evidence in support of the risk-taking channel. In fact, as can be seen by contrasting columns (4)- (6) with columns (7)- (9), the results indicate a signi…cant negative impact of ATPs on …rm value which is robust across ATP indices, but only for …rms with relatively high idiosyncratic volatility. The coe¢ cient estimate on ATPs implies that, for …rms with relatively high idiosyncratic volatility, the valuation e¤ect of ATPs is economically signi…cant. For example, looking at the E index (column 6), moving a …rm from the lowest (0 provisions) to the highest (6 provisions) level of takeover protection leads to a drop in Tobin's Q of about .69 -a drop which is about 35% of the mean Tobin's Q in our sample. By contrast, for …rms with low idiosyncratic volatility, robustly across di¤erent indices, ATPs do not have a statistically signi…cant e¤ect on …rm value.
Overall, these results provide strong support for our risk-taking channel, and suggest that ATPs lead to excess managerial conservatism. Thus, by curbing managers' tendency to avoid value-enhancing risks, corporate governance reforms can create value for shareholders.
Conclusion
(TBA)
Appendix A. Variable De…nitions
The variables used in this paper are extracted from four major data sources: IRRC, COMPUS-TAT, CRSP, and SDC Platinum. For each data item, we indicate the relevant source in square brackets. The speci…c variables used in the analysis are de…ned as follows:
Governance Measures (Higher index values correspond to more entrenchment) [IRRC]
-GIM-index is the sum of all antitakeover provisions in a …rm's charter that varies between 0 and 24.
-SB&P-index is the sum of the staggered board and poison pill indicators that ranges from 0 to 2.
-E-index is the sum of six provisions: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, limits to shareholder charter amendments, supermajority requirements for mergers, poison pills, and golden parachutes.
Idiosyncratic volatility is calculated for each month as a projection of each …rm's daily excess return, r it , on the daily market's excess return, r mt . The estimated idiosyncratic
Pr 2 md , T is the number of trading days in a month,r id denotes the demeaned excess return of stock i and on day d, andr md denotes the demeaned market excess return on day d. We use the one-month Treasury bill rate from Ibboson Associates as the risk-free rate and take CRSP's value-weighted returns of all stocks as the market portfolio. For our panel IRRC sample, which is at annual frequency, we calculate the mean of annualized monthly volatilities for each year. [CRSP] Outcome measures:
-Investment is capital expenditures (item 128) over total assets at the beginning of the …scal year (item 6).
[Compustat]
-R&D is the ratio of R&D expenditures (item 46, or 0 is missing) over lagged sales (item 12).
-Covariance between acquirer and target's stock returns 60 months before the date of the …rst bid for acquisitions made by …rms for which governance index data is available from the IRRC database. [SDC Platinum and CRSP]
-Implied change in bidder's equity variance resulting from the acquisition is measured as the variance of the two-asset (bidder and target) portfolio (weighted by the equity value of each …rm) less the variance of the bidder prior to the acquisition. [SDC Platinum and CRSP] -Tobin's Q is de…ned as the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets (item 6), where the market value of assets equals the book value of assets plus the market value of common equity less the sum of the book value of common equity (item 60) and balance sheet deferred taxes (item 74).
Controls:
-Size is log of the book value of assets (item 6), de ‡ated by CPI in 1990.
-Leverage is de…ned as long term debt (item 9) plus debt in current liabilities (item 34) over the sum of long term debt (item 9) plus debt in current liabilities (item 34) plus market value of equity (item 25*item199).
-Return on assets (ROA) is the ratio of operating income after depreciation (item 178) over lagged total assets (item 6).
-Advertising is the ratio of advertising expenditures (item 45, or 0 if missing) over lagged total sales (item 12).
-Cash ‡ow is de…ned as the sum of earnings before extraordinary items (item 18) and depreciation (item 14) over net property, plant and equipment at the beginning of the …scal year (item 8).
-Delaware incorporation is a dummy that takes the value of 1 for …rms incorporated in Delaware.
[IRRC]
Appendix B. Empirical Speci…cation -Details
A basic version of the dynamic model we estimate is: Arellano and Bond (1991) propose to di¤erence equation (1):
While di¤erencing eliminates the country-speci…c e¤ect, it introduces a new bias; by construction the new error term, (" it " it 1 ) is correlated with the lagged dependent variable, (y it 1 y it 2 ).
Under the assumptions that (a) the error term, ", is not serially correlated, and (b) the explanatory variables, X, are weakly exogenous (i.e., the explanatory variables are assumed to be uncorrelated with future realizations of the error term), Arellano and Bond propose the following moment conditions E [y it s (" it " it 1 )] = 0 f or s 2; t = 3; :::; T E [X it s (" it " it 1 )] = 0 f or s 2; t = 3; :::; T Using these moment conditions, Arellano and Bond (1991) propose a two-step GMM estimator.
In the …rst step the error terms are assumed to be independent and homoskedastic across countries and over time. In the second step, the residuals obtained in the …rst step are used to construct a consistent estimate of the variance-covariance matrix, thus relaxing the assumptions of independence and homoskedasticity. The two-step estimator is thus asymptotically more e¢ cient relative to the …rst-step estimator. We refer to the GMM estimator based on these conditions as the di¤erence estimator. This is the estimator that Rousseau and Wachtel (2000) use with annual data to examine the relationship between stock markets, banks, and economic growth.
To reduce the potential biases and imprecision associated with the di¤erence estimator, we use an estimator that combines in a system the regression in di¤erences with the regression in levels [Arellano and Bover, 1995 and Blundell and Bond, 1998 ]. The instruments for the regression in di¤erences are the same as above. The instruments for the regression in levels are the lagged di¤erences of the corresponding variables. These are appropriate instruments under the following additional assumption: although there may be correlation between the levels of the right-hand side variables and the country-speci…c e¤ect in equation (1), there is no correlation between the di¤erences of these variables and the country-speci…c e¤ect. Given that lagged levels are used as instruments in the regression in di¤erences, only the most recent di¤erence is used as an instrument in the regression in levels. Using additional lagged di¤erences would result in redundant moment conditions (Arellano and Bover, 1995) . Thus, additional moment conditions for the second part of the system (the regression in levels) are:
Thus, we use the moment conditions presented in equations (3) - (6) and employ the system panel estimator to generate consistent and e¢ cient parameter estimates.
Appendix C. Tables (6) and (7)- (9) report results when the sample is split between …rms with high (above sample mean) and low (below sample mean) values of idiosyncratic risk, respectively. Lagged variables dated t-3 and t-4 are used as instruments. Controls include log of total assets, cash ‡ow, Tobin's Q, and lagged squared capital expenditures. Year dummies are included in all regressions. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and within-…rm serial correlation appear below point estimates. The statistics m1 and m2 test the null of no …rst-and second-order autocorrelation in the …rst-di¤erenced residuals. Sargan is a test of the null that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. Levels of signi…cance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. All variable de…nitions are in Appendix A. (6) and (7)- (9) report results when the sample is split between …rms with high (above sample mean) and low (below sample mean) values of idiosyncratic risk, respectively. Lagged variables dated t-3 and t-4 are used as instruments. Controls include log of total assets, cash ‡ow, and Tobin's Q. Year dummies are included in all regressions. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and within-…rm serial correlation appear below point estimates. The statistics m1 and m2 test the null of no …rst-and second-order autocorrelation in the …rst-di¤erenced residuals. Sargan is a test of the null that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. Levels of signi…cance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. All variable de…nitions are in Appendix A. The sample is based on 960 acquisition announcement by …rms from IRRC in the 1990 to 2006 period. The table reports OLS regressions of the ex-ante covariance of equity returns between bidding and the target …rms (Panel A) and the implied change in bidders'equity variance resulting from the acquisition (Panel B) on measures of governance and …rm characteristics. For each of the dependent variables, lower value is associated with more diversifying acquisitions. Governance is measured by GIM, SB&P, and E indices. In both panels, Columns (1)- (3) report results for all …rms, and columns (4)- (6) and (7)- (9) report results when the sample is split between …rms with high (above sample mean) and low (below sample mean) values of idiosyncratic risk, respectively. Controls include log of total assets, cash ‡ow, and the ratio of long-term debt to assets. Year dummies are included in all regressions. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and within-…rm serial correlation appear below point estimates. Levels of signi…cance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. All variable de…nitions are in Appendix A. This table reports dynamic regressions of industry-adjusted Tobin's Q on measures of governance and …rm characteristics in the sample of 2302 …rms from IRRC in the 1990 to 2006 period. The dynamic regressions are estimated with two-step system GMM in …rst di¤erences to eliminate …rm …xed e¤ects. Tobin's Q is the market value of assets over the book value of assets, winsorized at 1% and adjusted for median Tobin's Q in the industry. Industry is de…ned by three-digit SIC code. Governance is measured by GIM, SB&P, and E indices. Columns (1)- (3) report results for all …rms. Columns (4)- (6) and (7)- (9) report results when the sample is split between …rms with high (above sample mean) and low (below sample mean) values of idiosyncratic risk, respectively. Lagged variables dated t-3 and t-4 are used as instruments. Controls include log of total assets, the ratio of capital expenditures to assets, the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales,the ratio of advertising and sales expense to sales, the ratio of long-term debt to assets, and the (log) number of segments. Year dummies are included in all regressions. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and within-…rm serial correlation appear below point estimates. The statistics m1 and m2 test the null of no …rst-and second-order autocorrelation in the …rst-di¤erenced residuals. Sargan is a test of the null that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. Levels of signi…cance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. All variable de…nitions are in Appendix A. 
